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I. ABSTRACT
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has worked on
network layer mobility for more than 10 years and a number
of RFCs are available by now. Although the IETF mobility
protocols are not present in the Internet infrastructure as of
today, deployment seems to be imminent since a number
of organizations, including 3GPP, 3GPP2 and Wimax, have
realized the need to incorporate these protocols into their ar-
chitectures. Deployment scenarios reach from mobility support
within the network of a single provider to mobility support
between different providers and technologies. Current Wimax
specifications, for example, already support Mobile IPv4,
Proxy Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6. Future specifications will
also support Proxy Mobile IPv6. Upcoming specifications in
the 3GPP Evolved Packet Core (EPC) will include the use of
Mobile IPv4, Dual Stack MIPv6 and Proxy Mobile IPv6 for
interworking between 3GPP and non 3GPP networks.
This paper provides an overview on the state-of-the-art
in IETF mobility protocols as they are being considered by
standardization organizations outside the IETF and focusing
on security aspects.
II. THE NEED FOR SECURITY
Mobile IP [3], [20] offers a reachability service for mobile
nodes (MNs) in which an MN is always identified by the same
IP address, namely its home address, regardless of its current
point of attachment to the Internet. While away from home a
mobile node associates an other IP address, its care-of address
with its home address with the help of mobility signalling.
The care-of address provides the information about the mobile
node’s current location. Packets addressed to a mobile node’s
home address are tunneled to its care-of address. The mobility
signaling for this type of communication happens between the
mobile node (MN) and the home agent (HA). The details of the
mobility signaling procedures are different for IPv4 and IPv6
but the underlying principles are the same. The description
in this document focuses mainly on IPv6 since it reflects the
more recent development in mobility signaling.
Mobile IPv6 supports establishing a bi-directional tunnel
between the MN and the HA such that the traffic between a
MN and a CN is routed through the HA in both directions.
Alternatively, Mobile IPv6 offers triangular routing and route
optimization [3], [21]. In the former case, packets from a
MN are directly addressed to the corresponding node (CN)
whereas packets in the reverse direction travel through the
HA. In the latter case, packets are directly exchanged between
the MN and the CN without involving the HA. In order
to get this procedure to work there is the need to perform
mobility signaling between MN, HA and CN. Although route
optimization is preferred from a performance point of view
network operators prefer to have a tight control over the data
traffic and plan to disable this functionality.
In addition to the basic mobility signaling protocols [3],
[20], performance enhancements were developed. An example
is Hierarchical Mobile IP (HMIP [22]), which allows signaling
and data traffic to be routed locally in the visited network to
which the MN is attached as long as MN moves within the vis-
ited network. As a consequence, local mobility anchor points
had to be introduced into the architecture. Fig. 1 shows all
the involved entities. Another example is Fast Handovers for
Mobile IP (FMIP [23]), which accelerates the reestablishment
of IP connectivity for a moving MN e.g. by establishing a
tunnel between the old and new CoA at the access routers in
order to overcome the latency of binding updates. So far, these
localized mobility schemes have largely a theoretical character.
Fig. 1. Entities in the Mobile Internet Architecture
A more interesting trend that evolved in the past few
years is shifting the burden of mobility management from the
MN to the network and thus performing mobility handling
independent of the MN itself. This concept is reflected in
Proxy Mobile IP (PMIP [18], [19]). PMIP signaling starts
at a node close to the MN (such as the access router) and
terminates at a HA. The access router emulates the home
network to MN such that the mobility on the IP layer is hidden
from the MN.
With all these mobility signaling protocols that can run be-
tween the MN, HA, CN, local mobility anchors and at access
routers the classical communication security problems arise:
authentication and key establishment between the signaling
nodes, integrity protection, replay protection and in some cases
confidentiality protection of the signaling traffic.
To provide integrity and replay protection of mobility sig-
naling in MIPv6 between the MN and the HA two approaches
were developed; IPsec protection [3] and an approach similar
to Mobile IPv4 called MIPv6 Authentication Protocol [6]. For
IPsec protection IKEv2 [5] in concert with EAP and Diameter
EAP [8] was selected for authentication and key exchange be-
tween MN and HA. If the MIPv6 Auth. Protocol is used, then
the keys required for integrity and replay protection between
MN and HA are derived from keys established between MN
and home AAA prior to MIPv6 usage. In Wimax and 3GPP
both security approaches are currently under consideration.
Both approaches to secure MIPv6 require the interaction
with the AAA infrastructure. This interaction of mobility sig-
naling with the back-end infrastructure also allows to simplify
configuration tasks, such as the configuration of Home Agents
and Home Addresses, and offers key distribution capability (a
feature that is needed for the MIPv6 Authentication Protocol).
This work is referred to as Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping [7], [10],
and investigates two scenarios: the integrated scenario [24] and
the split scenario [4]. In the integrated scenario the network
access authentication procedure run between the MN, the
AAA client (e.g., access router), local AAA and the home
AAA server is used to convey parameters and to establish
the keying material for subsequent mobility signaling. This
back-end interaction is described in [13], [24]. Conveying the
configuration parameters, such as Home Agent address, to
the MN happens with the help of DHCP [14]. Subsequently,
when the interaction between the MN and the HA takes place
the HA still has to interact with the AAA server [4]. In the
split scenario there is no such dependency on the network
access authentication and the entire bootstrapping procedure
is executed between the MN and the HA on the front-end
side and between the HA and the AAA server on the back-end
side [4]. The back-end infrastructure solutions are available for
RADIUS as well as for Diameter and the integrated scenario
variant using RADIUS is used in Wimax.
Integrity and replay protection of PMIP signaling between
an access router and the HA is based on IPsec. The corre-
sponding security associations are established with the help of
IKEv2. An authentication option similar to the one specified
for MIPv4 or in the MIPv6 Authentication Protocol [6] is
currently not specified for PMIP. The respective interaction
with the back-end infrastructure for PMIP is outlined in [17].
III. CONCLUSION
The specification of the basic mobility signaling protocols
including the PMIP protocols can be considered matured.
Nevertheless, there are still related open issues to be solved.
An example for such an issue is that currently firewalls
are typically not aware of MIP-related traffic and therefore
interfers with MIP signaling. The problem and some solutions
are described in [12], [25], [27]. Another related open issue
is location privacy [16], [26]: revealing the care-of address
to the CN can reveal location information to the CN and
eavesdropping on binding updates can allow an outsider to
track the movement of the MN. The work in these problem
areas is still ongoing.
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